Introduksiyon -/- 50-50. Fifty-fifty. Sa bigkas ng mga Pinoy, “pipti-pipti.” Sa kontekstong Pilipino, pantukoy ito sa kalagayan ng taong nasa kritikal na kalagayan. Limampung porsyento ng tsansang makaligtas, limampung porsyento ng tsansang masawi. Kilala ito sa iba pang katawagan sa Pilipinas bilang “naghihingalo,” “nasa bingit ng kamatayan” o “nag-aagawbuhay.” Ganito mailalarawan ang kalagayan ng lipunang Pilipino sa ilalim ng Batas Militar ni Ferdinand Marcos, Sr. Para sa mga pabor sa Batas Militar at mga loyalista ni Marcos, 50-50 dahil sa banta (...) raw ng komunismo at tangkang pagpapabagsak sa Republika. Para sa mga kritiko’t lumaban sa diktadura, 50- 50 dahil sa pang-aabuso’t paniniil ng rehimen laban sa taumbayan. 50-50. Ito ang sa tingin nami’y nababagay na pamagat ng aklat na ito. Una, ginugunita ng sambayanang Pilipino ngayong 2022 ang ika-50 taong anibersaryo ng Batas Militar. Idineklara ni Marcos noong Setyembre 21, 1972 ang Proclamation 1081 na naglagay sa buong bansa sa ilalim ng kamay na bakal. Pangalawa, itinatampok ng aklat ang 50 personalidad na may mga direkta at aktibong papel para o laban sa Batas Militar. Dalawampu’t lima (25) ang nagmula sa bakuran ng rehimeng Marcos. Bukod sa diktador at kanyang pamilya, sila ang mga pangunahing tagapagbalangkas at tagapagpatupad ng Batas Militar. Kasabwat sila sa kabuuang operasyon ng mga mekanismo ng awtoritaryanismong ito – mapapulitikal, ekonomiko o sosyokultural man. Sila rin ang mga nakinabang, kung hindi man nagpakasasa, sa lahat ng mga ganansyang dulot ng kolaborasyon at paglilingkod sa diktadura. Ang nalalabing 25 ay binubuo naman ng mga humamon at nanindigan laban sa kamay na bakal. Magkakaiba ang kanilang pinagmulan, mga adhikain at dulog sa pagtindig laban sa Batas Militar – armadong pakikibaka, pagkilos sa mga lansangan, paglaban mula sa pulpito, at iba pa. (shrink)

This essay, by the editor of Common Knowledge, responds to a piece by Dionigi Albera that, in turn, responds to Jeffrey Perl’s introduction, published in May 2017, to CK’s multipart symposium on xenophilia. Albera argues that the ambivalence that Perl observes in many instances of xenophilia needs genealogical explanation, and Albera turns for this purpose to analysis of the relationship between Aphrodite and Ares in Greco-Roman mythology. In the present piece, Perl extends that exploration in analysis of a series (...) of images in which the gods of love and war, along with their illegimate children Eros and Phobos, are given comical and often vulgar treatment by artists ranging from Botticelli and Mantegna, in the fifteenth century; to Titian, Veronese, and Tintoretto, in the sixteenth; to Rubens, Jan Bruegel the Elder, and Poussin, in the seventeenth; to Lagrenée, in the eighteenth; to David and Guillemot, in the nineteenth; to Jeff Koons in our own day. Perl and Albera agree with these artists that the antithetical pair, Aphrodite and Ares, have a fully logical, if furtive relationship in mythology, iconography, and psychology. The idealization to which the comic images respond—that when warriors make love, there is no warfare—is laughed, again and again, out of court. But Perl’s concern, unlike Albera’s, is that this cynicism on the part of artists and advanced intellectuals means that, despite their ostensible preference for peace over conflict, they will always find cause to undermine every effort to make way for peace. (shrink)

In this introduction to part three of the Common Knowledge symposium “Fuzzy Studies: On the Consequence of Blur,” the journal’s editor argues that blur is not a medium of concealment, confusion, or evasion. Making distinctions between kinds of relative unclarity, he reserves the word blur for the kind that results from de-differentiating objects or qualities or states of affairs whose differences have been overstated. To refine what blur is and is not, he compares kinds of unclarity found in images by (...) Giotto, Rubens, Hokusai, Kunitora, Manet, Zeshin, and Richter. With reference to art criticism by Hubert Damisch, Wayne Andersen, Anthony Hughes, Robert Storr, Julian Bell, Christopher Prendergast, and especially T. J. Clark, he agrees that choosing between focus and blur can be a moral decision, though not in the sense for which Clark arraigns the Impressionists. Characterizing the way of seeing that Clark encourages in The Painting of Modern Life as a form of staring, this essay argues that “lean and hungry looking” is indecent, whereas unfocused receptivity is irenic. What Bell calls the “aestheticized halfheartedness” of Manet is redescribed here as a genre of moral heroism, and the essay concludes that it is differentiation that is on morally shaky ground. (shrink)

Spinoza’s epistemology aims at the development of ‘adequate’ and the removal of ‘confused’ ideas. His theory of confusion raises many questions, however. It has often been thought that the confusion of an idea is mind-relative, such that an idea might be confused in my mind but adequate in God’s. In this paper I argue that confusion cannot be mind-relative, because an idea’s confusion is determined by what it represents and for Spinoza, ideas are individuated by their representational content. Instead, I (...) propose that although it is possible to consider one and the same idea both adequately and confusedly, what such acts of considering pick up on are mind-independent features of ideas. (shrink)

This article explores the connections between David Hume's theory of prejudice, present-day theories of structural ignorance, and Hume's own racist attitudes. Charles Mills has identified certain types of ignorance, including racial ignorance, that result from social structures. Here, I argue that Hume can do something similar. Hume uses the concept of prejudice to theorize the misjudgment of someone based on their perceived membership of a certain group. Despite its seemingly individualist presentation in the Treatise, Hume's theory can, as a result (...) of his deeply social view of the mind, be expanded to account for social-structural influences on the formation of prejudices. In fact, in several places he himself develops such structural explanations. On the resulting picture, both his racism and his theory of prejudice are seen to play important roles in his philosophy. (shrink)

Una de las categorías empleadas en la sistematización de las posturas en teología filosófica es “teísmo clásico”, con la que se hace referencia a un grupo indeterminado de autores que mantendrían posturas comunes acerca de Dios y la religión. Hay numerosos intentos de definición del teísmo clásico: se recogen cinco que parecen especialmente relevantes, y se valora la caracterización de Dios que atribuyen al teísmo clásico. Esta valoración revela que sólo coinciden en un atributo: la inmutabilidad. Se analizan las razones (...) y consecuencias de esta característica, lo que da pie a mostrar que tomar como punto de partida para las discusiones teológicas una definición del teísmo clásico es un modo problemático de proceder; a partir de esto se sugieren métodos alternativos que tengan en cuenta la relevancia tanto de las religiones en las que surgen las posturas denominadas clásicas, así como los sistemas propios de los principales autores identificados como teístas clásicos. Abstract: One of the categories used in the systematization of positions in philosophical theology is “classical theism,” which refers to an indeterminate group of authors who uphold common views regarding God and religion. There are numerous attempts to define classical theism; five particularly relevant definitions are examined, along with an evaluation of the characterization of God they attribute to classical theism. This assessment reveals that these definitions converge on only one attribute: immutability. The reasons for and consequences of this characteristic are analyzed, leading to the conclusion that using a definition of classical theism as a starting point for theological discussions is a problematic approach. Based on this, alternative methods are suggested that take into account both the relevance of the religious traditions in which so-called classical positions arise, and the specific systems of the major authors identified as classical theists. (shrink)

This chapter will attempt to show that there are no particulars that are causings, no acts or events of causing. As in the chapters on trying, it is important to show (a) some of the negative consequences of introducing causing-particulars; (b) that there is no need to reify causings in that way; and (c) that there is an alternative to their introduction.There is however one adverbial modification that needs special examination: ‘with instrument i’. Does (1) ‘P openedt the door with (...) a crowbar’ imply (2) ‘P caused the door to openi with a crowbar’? If so, it seems that (2) attributes ‘with a crowbar’ either to an openingi or to a causing. What other options might there be? The second option would give us causing particulars.According to a rule of Terence Parsons’, the first option is ruled out. Instrumentals must be attributed to actions, not events, and so, extrapolating this to the case of causing something, one seems to need an act of causing to which the instrumental could be attributed. I look at an ‘ingenious’ solution due to Maria Alvarez that accepts that rule, but would still not require any quantification over causings. I then consider a reply to her by Erasmus Mayr that shows that her solution will not work. I end by showing how one-particularism solves the problem, but at the cost of denying Parsons’ rule. (shrink)

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Nietzsche employs the Child as a futural ????igure of af????irmation be-yond the human, which overcomes the “spirit of revenge” and the weight of the past. As Nietzsche dreams of the Child, colonial-ism/coloniality speci????ically targets children to sever communities and impose a civilizational-colonial future. In this article, I read Nietzsche’s question of the human/Overman through Wynter’s so-ciogenic terms of Man/the human. Then, I turn to Fanon’s soci-ogeny of childhood and its transformation during the Algerian Rev-olution. Recasting Nietzsche’s questions in light of (...) violence against children, Fanon provides a different response: overcoming the spirit of revenge and the creation of new values occur through the shared commitment and praxis of decolonization. Children participate in and are witnesses to this transformation beyond the ????igures of Man and Child. Nietzsche utilise l’Enfant comme une ????igure future de l’af????irmation au-delà de l’humain, qui surmonte l’« esprit de vengeance » et le poids du passé. Alors que Nietzsche rêve de l’Enfant, le colonia-lisme/la colonialité cible spéci????iquement les enfants pour rompre les communautés et imposer un avenir civilisationnel-colonial. Dans cet article, je lis la question de Nietzsche sur l’humain/ Surhomme à travers les termes sociogéniques de Wynter sur l’Homme/l’humain. Ensuite, je me tourne vers la sociogénie de l’enfance de Fanon et sa transformation pendant la Révolution al-gérienne. En recontextualisant les questions de Nietzsche à la lu-mière de la violence contre les enfants sous le colonialisme/la colo-nialité, Fanon offre une réponse différente: surmonter l’esprit de vengeance et créer de nouvelles valeurs se réalisent à travers l’engagement partagé et la praxis de la décolonisation. Les enfants participent à et sont témoins de cette transformation au-delà des ????igures de l’Homme et de l’Enfant. (shrink)

I start by explaining what an intrinsic event is. The expression, ‘intrinsic event’, is not innocent; I explain it as best I can here, but the remainder of the book returns repeatedly to this idea and further clarifies it.Philosophers and linguists interested in the question of the relation between doing and causing often refer to, and often conflate, two claims. One of the claims, which is often referred to as Causative Alternation (CA) in the linguistics literature, is an indisputable truth (...) of semantics and the other, (PT) (for ‘Paraphrase Thesis’), is a controversial philosophical analysis. A theme of the chapter is the need to separate out views on the semantics of action verbs from views about the metaphysics of action.The Paraphrase Thesis (PT) says, roughly, that an agent acts iff he [but note: he, not his action] causes some event, for instance, e, and e is then said (in many cases) to be intrinsic to that action. (PT) is false. Since it entails a biconditional, it has two parts: a left-to-right entailment and a right-to-left entailment. In this chapter I examine only the right-to-left entailment.I distinguish the expressions ‘P caused such-and-such’, ‘P was a cause of such-and-such’, and ‘P was the cause of such-and-such’. I also introduce a distinction about causation in order to support my dismissal of the right-to-left entailment: remoteness of cause and partiality of cause. (shrink)

Does the LHS of (PT) entail its RHS? When a person acts (and the action verb is an ergative verb), isn’t it trivially true that he causes, i.e., that he is a cause of, the event intrinsic to the action, trivially true that he brings that very event about? Are all doings causings even if not all causings are doings? It is this question that this chapter addresses.I do hold that the LHS of (PT) entails the RHS. But should we (...) understand the LHS and the RHS of (CA) as being about two particulars or as using two descriptions of a single particular? I describe one-particularism as the view that takes the second of those options. I strengthen the case for one-particularism by looking at the idea of Cambridge changes (and hence Cambridge actions). I examine two obvious counter-arguments to one-particularism: (a) that, on an action chain, an action doesn’t cause another action, but it only causes the event that is intrinsic to its successor action on the chain, if it has one; (b) Alvin Goldman’s view, shared by many others, that would imply that one-particularism gets the time of an action wrong. (shrink)

This chapter has two sections, both of which develop some of the consequences of one-particularism. The first section is about the possibility that some regress, vicious or otherwise, arises on the conjunction of one-particularism and the left-to-right inference of (PT), since I accept both of those conjuncts.The second question is a sceptical question. Could there be a possible world in which no other agents, minded like ourselves, ever act, either intentionally or unintentionally, although, for all the events that would have (...) been intrinsic or extrinsic to their actions had they acted, there are intrinsically qualitatively identical mere events that occur anyway? If there were such a possible world, how would a person know whether the world that he is in is that world or some other world in which the other agents really do act?Do I solve the sceptical question about knowledge of the actions of others that I introduce? No. I tentatively outline (but do not commit myself to) a ‘disjunctivist’ suggestion for addressing the sceptical question. The discussion on scepticism also allows me to apply (CTT) from Chap. 10.1007/978-3-319-90347-7_4 and to demonstrate how it works in thinking about this question about others’ actions. It also allows me to make some points of (I believe) some interest about the epistemology of action. (shrink)

I intend to use this introduction as a vehicle for situating the topics discussed in this book within a wider philosophical context, and to describe the main ideas in each chapter. This introduction contains no arguments defending or justifying that context or the presuppositions of my discussion (there will be arguments aplenty about other matters in the following chapters). In theology, a distinction is sometimes drawn between apologetic and confessional theological literature. Apologetic literature seeks to defend a point of view (...) to an audience that is outside the circle of believers; it attempts to convince them of something. Confessional theological literature accepts a point of view as given, but then explains and develops it for those inside the tradition, those who have already ‘bought in’ to the basic assumptions. This Introduction might be thought of as a piece of confessional philosophy, making explicit some of the doxological presuppositions of the book to the already-believers. (shrink)

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This paper argues that the challenges posed by climate change and the need to quickly move toward a sustainable low-carbon future require the contributions of development ethics. I propose four tasks for development ethics. The first relates to unpacking the urgency posed by climate change by showing how, from an ethical perspective, the impacts of climate change are extremely dangerous risks, especially for those most vulnerable, and thus require immediate attention. The second relates to a better understanding of the components (...) of well-being. The third relates to concerns regarding the global commons and to the need to reframe key components of socio-ecological balance as public goods. The fourth and last task of development ethics refers to the multiple trade-offs and dilemmas in the processes leading to a low-carbon and equitable future arguing for strengthening public deliberation and democracy. (shrink)

How are we to understand the notion of concept, the very concept of concept itself? One natural way, it seems to me, is to take Fregean sense as a model, and imposing similar constraints on a theory of concepts. This approach has the advantage, among others, of allowing for a distinction to be made between publicly shared, objective concepts, on the one hand, and private, subjective mental representations on the other - a distinction which, I believe, is desirable for various (...) reasons. One problem with Frege. (shrink)

One of the essential distinctions in action theory is that between activity and passivity. I address this distinction in this article.

ABSTRACT The field of development ethics has evolved over the years to incorporate topics that have become of the utmost importance in achieving fair and sustainable development for all. This is not the place to review such a conceptual evolution from the origins of Denis Goulet’s writings, but I wish to note how the saliency of development ethics is highly dependent on speaking to and relating with issues of central importance to global society. In this brief piece I want to (...) focus on a particular challenge for the field of development ethics: how to move beyond rethinking and reframing so this field provides guidance for the needed systemic global transformations. (shrink)

A discussion of three central ideas in action theory; trying to act, doing or acting, one's action causing further consequences.

A careful elaboration and defence of holism in the philosophy of the social sciences, with regard both to particulars and properties. The last chapter addresses the issue of the irreducibility of holistic explanation in the social sciences.

What I shall do in this paper is to propose an analysis of ‘Agent P tries to A’ in terms of a subjunctive conditional, that avoids some of the problems that beset most alternative accounts of trying, which I call ‘referential views’. They are so-named because on these alternative accounts, ‘P tries to A’ entails that there is a trying to A by P, and therefore the expression ‘P’s trying to A’ can occur in the subject of a sentence and (...) be used to refer to a particular, namely an act or event of trying. A conditional account such as mine avoids having to answer questions about those alleged particulars, for example their location and their causal relation to physical actions, or alternatively their identity to physical actions. In brief, the analysis I propose eschews any need to quantify over any sort of trying particulars. I both clarify the proposal and deal with five possible objections to it: metaphysically impossible actions: cases of finking and reverse-cycle finking; the empirical emptiness of preventers and blockers; proximate intentions and trying; and alleged explanatory loss. (shrink)